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Abstract
We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a
strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which
is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its
implications. Our results are two characterizations of the Pareto rule: (1) it is the only rule
satisfying efficiency and converse reduction-consistency and (2) it is the only rule satisfying
one-agent efficiency, converse reduction-consistency, and reduction-consistency.
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We consider the problem of selecting alternatives from a set of feasible alternatives
over which each agent has a strict preference (no indiﬀerence between any two alterna-
tives). Such a problem, called a “collective choice problem,” arises for instance when
the members of a committee have to elect new members from a slate of candidates.
How should the candidate(s) be elected? A “rule” is a mapping that associates with
each such problem a non-empty subset of the feasible set.
Our goal here is to propose an invariance property, “converse reduction-consistency,”
of rules and study its implications. The property is the converse of “reduction-
consistency” (Yeh, 2006), which is an application for collective choice problems of
a general principle of “consistency.”1 Reduction-consistency says the following. Con-
sider a problem and an alternative x chosen by a rule for it. Imagine now that some
agents “leave” with the understanding that x would be chosen, and reassess the sit-
uation from the viewpoint of the remaining agents. A condition for an alternative to
be acceptable as a choice by the remaining agents is that each of the departing agents
be indeed guaranteed a welfare level that he was initially promised. The revised
preferences of the remaining agents are then obtained by restricting their original
preferences to those acceptable alternatives. Reduction-consistency requires that x
should still be chosen by the rule in the reduced situation just deﬁned.2 Our main
property, converse reduction-consistency, says that if an alternative is chosen by a
rule for all of its associated reduced situations, then it should be chosen by the rule
for the original problem.
We ﬁrst study the existence of rules that satisfy converse reduction-consistency.
As we show, the Pareto rule, which chooses all “Pareto-eﬃcient” alternatives for each
problem, is conversely reduction-consistent (Proposition 1). Moreover, it can be veri-
ﬁed that the Pareto rule is also reduction-consistent. Is there any rule other than the
Pareto rule that satisﬁes the two properties? The answer is yes. The feasibility rule,
which chooses all feasible alternatives for each problem, is another example. However,
the rule violates the basic requirement of eﬃciency: if an alternative is chosen, there
is no other alternative that all agents strictly prefer.3 Of course, the Pareto rule is
eﬃcient. We ask whether there exists any rule other than the Pareto rule satisfying ef-
ﬁciency, reduction-consistency, and converse reduction-consistency. Surprisingly, the
answer is no. In fact, a more general result can be proved: eﬃciency and converse
reduction-consistency are satisﬁed only by the Pareto rule (Theorem 1). Note that
as we show, under reduction-consistency, eﬃciency is equivalent to a weaker version
of eﬃciency, “one-agent eﬃciency,”4 obtained by restricting attention to one-agent
situations (Lemma 1). Thus, Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 give us another characteri-
zation of the Pareto rule. Namely, it is the only rule satisfying one-agent eﬃciency,
reduction-consistency, and converse reduction-consistency (Theorem 2).
1For a comprehensive survey of consistency and its converse, see Thomson (2000).
2The deﬁnition of reduction-consistency is motivated by the notion of the property, “separability,”
which is proposed by Moulin (1984) in the model of choosing a point in an interval over which agents
have “single-peaked preferences.”
3Ju (2005) considers the problem of choosing a subset of alternatives over which each agent has
a “trichotomous” or “dichotomous” preference, and bases characterizations of plurality-like social
choice rules on eﬃciency.
4Ching (1996) refers to it as individuality.
12 Notation and deﬁnitions
There is an inﬁnite set of “potential” agents, indexed by the natural numbers N. Let
N denote the class of non-empty and ﬁnite subsets of N. Let X be a set of potential
alternatives. We assume that X is countably inﬁnite. Let X denote the class of non-
empty and ﬁnite subsets of X. We use ⊂ for strict set inclusion, and ⊆ for weak set
inclusion.
Given N ∈ N, X ∈ X, and i ∈ N, agent i’s preference relation on X,
denoted by Ri, is a binary relation on X. We assume that Ri satisﬁes the following
two conditions. We say that Ri is complete if for each {x,y} ⊆ X, we have either
x Ri y or y Ri x. Thus, completeness implies that for each x ∈ X, x Ri x. We say
that Ri is transitive if for each {x,y,z} ⊆ X, x Ri y and y Ri z together imply
x Ri z. Throughout our presentation, we restrict attention to preference relations
for which distinct alternatives are never indiﬀerent. Formally, Ri is strict if for each
{x,y} ⊆ X, x Ri y and y Ri x together imply x = y. Let Pi denote the strict
preference relation derived from Ri. Let P(X) be the class of all strict preference
relations on X. A preference proﬁle on X is a list P ≡ (Pi)i∈N such that for
each i ∈ N, Pi ∈ P(X). A choice problem for N, or simply a problem for N, is
a pair (X,P) such that X ∈ X and P ∈ PN(X).5 Let DN denote the class of all
problems for N, and D ≡
S
N∈N DN. A choice rule on D, or simply a rule on D, is a
correspondence that associates with each N ∈ N and each (X,P) ∈ DN a non-empty
subset of X. Our generic notation for rules is ϕ.
We now introduce the Pareto rule. It is the rule that chooses all “Pareto-eﬃcient”
alternatives.
Pareto rule, PE: For each N ∈ N and each (X,P) ∈ DN,
PE (X,P) ≡ {x ∈ X |@ y ∈ X\{x} such that y Pi x ∀i ∈ N }.
The Pareto rule satisﬁes the following properties informally deﬁned in the intro-
duction.
Eﬃciency: For each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈ DN, and each x ∈ ϕ(X,P), there is no
y ∈ X\{x} such that for each i ∈ N, y Pi x.
One-agent eﬃciency: For each N ∈ N with |N| = 1, each (X,P) ∈ DN, and each
x ∈ ϕ(X,P), there is no y ∈ X\{x} such that for each i ∈ N, y Pi x.
Clearly, eﬃciency implies one-agent eﬃciency. As we show in the next section,
one-agent eﬃciency, when imposed in conjunction with the following invariance prop-
erty introduced by Yeh (2006), implies eﬃciency. To deﬁne the property, we introduce
the following notation. Let N ∈ N with |N| > 1, (X,P) ∈ DN with |X| > 1, x ∈ X,
and N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂ N. Let X0 ≡ {y ∈ X | y Pi x ∀i ∈ N \ N0 }
S
{x}. For each
i ∈ N0, let Pi|X0 denote the restriction of Pi to X0. Formally, for each {y,z} ⊆ X0,
y Pi z if and only if y Pi|X0 z. Then, the reduced problem of (X,P) relative to
x and N0, denoted rx









5PN(X) means the Cartesian product of |N| copies of P(X), indexed by the elements of N.
Similar expressions in the rest of the paper should be interpreted in the same manner.
2Reduction-consistency: For each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈ DN, each x ∈ ϕ(X,P),
and each N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂ N, we have rx
N0 (X,P) ∈ DN0 and x ∈ ϕ(rx
N0(X,P)).6
Next is the converse of reduction-consistency, which is central to our analysis.
Converse reduction-consistency: For each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈ DN, and
each x ∈ X, if for each N0 ⊂ N, rx




We present two characterizations of the Pareto rule and start with the following fact,
which is used to prove the existence parts of our results.
Proposition 1 The Pareto rule satisﬁes converse reduction-consistency.
Proof. Let N ∈ N, (X,P) ∈ DN, and x ∈ X. Let N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂ N,
rx
N0(X,P) ∈ DN0, and x ∈ PE(rx
N0(X,P)). We show that x ∈ PE(X,P). Suppose,
by contradiction, that x / ∈ PE(X,P). Then, there is y ∈ X\{x} such that for each
i ∈ N, y Pi x. Thus, (i) for each i ∈ N0, y Pi x and (ii) for each i ∈ N\N0, y Pi x. It
follows that x / ∈ PE(rx
N0(X,P)), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Thanks to Proposition 1, we are now ready to prove our ﬁrst characterization of
the Pareto rule.8
Theorem 1 The Pareto rule is the only rule satisfying eﬃciency and converse
reduction-consistency.
Proof. Clearly, the Pareto rule satisﬁes eﬃciency. As shown in Proposition 1, the
rule satisﬁes converse reduction-consistency. Conversely, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the
two properties. Let N ∈ N and (X,P) ∈ DN. We show that PE (X,P) = ϕ(X,P).
The proof is by induction on |N|.
Case 1: |N| = 1. Since there is only one agent and his preference relation is
strict, |PE (X,P)| = 1. By eﬃciency, ϕ(X,P) ⊆ PE (X,P). Thus, PE (X,P) =
ϕ(X,P).
Case 2: |N| > 1. The induction hypothesis is that for each N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂
N and 1 ≤ |N0| < |N|, and each (X0,P 0) ∈ DN0, PE (X0,P 0) = ϕ(X0,P 0). We
show that PE (X,P) = ϕ(X,P). By eﬃciency, ϕ(X,P) ⊆ PE (X,P). We show
next that PE (X,P) ⊆ ϕ(X,P). Let x ∈ PE (X,P). Note that the Pareto rule
is reduction-consistent. It follows that for each N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂ N and each
6Alternatively, we can deﬁne reduction-consistency as follows: for each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈
DN, each x ∈ ϕ(X,P), and each N0 ∈ N with N0 ⊂ N, if rx
N0 (X,P) ∈ DN
0
, then x ∈ ϕ(rx
N0(X,P)).
Our results do not change essentially even if we use this alternative deﬁnition.
7Alternatively, we can deﬁne converse reduction-consistency by writing the hypothesis only for
all subsets of size 2. Formally, for each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈ DN and each x ∈ X, if for each
N0 ⊂ N with |N0| = 2, rx
N0(X,P) ∈ DN
0
and x ∈ ϕ(rx
N0(X,P)), then x ∈ ϕ(X,P). However, if
we use this alternative deﬁnition, the uniqueness parts of our main results are not guaranteed. For
detailed discussions, see the concluding remarks.
8The proof of Case 2 of Theorem 1 is an application of the “Elevator Lemma” (Thomson, 2000),
which states that if a rule ϕ is consistent, ϕ0 is conversely consistent, and ϕ ⊆ ϕ0 in the two-agent
case, then ϕ ⊆ ϕ0 in general.
3rx
N0(X,P) ∈ DN0, x ∈ PE (rx
N0(X,P)). Since |N0| < |N|, by induction hypothesis,
ϕ(rx
N0(X,P)) = PE (rx
N0(X,P)). Thus, x ∈ ϕ(rx
N0(X,P)). By converse reduction-
consistency, x ∈ ϕ(X,P). Q.E.D.
Our second characterization of the Pareto rule makes use of the following logical
relation between one-agent eﬃciency, reduction-consistency, and eﬃciency.9
Lemma 1 If a rule satisﬁes one-agent eﬃciency and reduction-consistency, then it
satisﬁes eﬃciency.
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying one-agent eﬃciency and reduction-consistency. We
show that ϕ is eﬃcient. Suppose, by contradiction, that ϕ is not eﬃcient. Then,
there is N ∈ N, (X,P) ∈ DN, and x ∈ ϕ(X,P) in which there is y ∈ X\{x} such
that for each i ∈ N, y Pi x. Let N0 ⊂ N with |N0| = 1. By reduction-consistency,
x ∈ ϕ(rx
N0 (X,P)). Since for each i ∈ N, y Pi x, it follows that x is not the most
preferred alternative in the reduction problem rx
N0 (X,P). Thus, it contradicts one-
agent eﬃciency. Q.E.D.
Our second characterization of the Pareto rule is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. We omit its proof.
Theorem 2 The Pareto rule is the only rule satisfying one-agent eﬃciency, reduction-
consistency, and converse reduction-consistency.
We now show that the properties listed in Theorems 1 and 2 are logically indepen-
dent. For this purpose, we introduce additional rules. The ﬁrst rule, Z, chooses all
feasible alternatives. Formally, for each N ∈ N and each (X,P) ∈ DN, Z(X,P) ≡ X.
Next is the family of ﬁxed-order rules introduced by Yeh (2006).10 Formally, let
P0 ∈ P(X) be a strict preference relation on X. Then, the ﬁxed-order rule relative
to P0, F P0, chooses the most preferred alternative according to P0 from the set of
Pareto-eﬃcient alternatives. Formally, for each N ∈ N and each (X,P) ∈ DN,
F P0(X,P) ≡ {x ∈ PE(X,P)| for each y ∈ PE (X,P)\{x}, x P0 y}.
The last rule is a modiﬁcation of the feasibility rule. To deﬁne it, we introduce
the top rule, Top, which chooses the alternatives most preferred by at least one agent.
Formally, for each N ∈ N, each (X,P) ∈ DN, each x ∈ X, and each i ∈ N, if x is the
most preferred alternative according to Pi, then t(x,Pi) ≡ 1; otherwise, t(x,Pi) ≡ 0.
Then, Top(X,P) ≡ {x ∈ X |∃i ∈ N such that t(x,Pi) = 1}. Thus, our modiﬁed
feasibility rule, Z∗, is deﬁned as follows. If there is only one agent, it chooses the
most preferred alternative of that agent; otherwise, it chooses all feasible alternatives.
For each N ∈ N and each (X,P) ∈ DN, if |N| = 1, then Z∗ (X,P) ≡ Top(X,P);
otherwise, Z∗ (X,P) ≡ Z (X,P).
The feasibility rule satisﬁes converse reduction-consistency but violates eﬃciency.
The ﬁxed-order rules satisfy eﬃciency but violate converse reduction-consistency.
9Similar results have also been obtained in the theory of TU games. For references, see Lemma 5.4
in Peleg (1985), Lemma 5.5 in Peleg (1986), and Lemma 1 in Tadenuma (1992).
10This family of rules is inspired by the family of “target rules” studied by Ching and Thom-
son (1992) in the context of choosing a point in an interval over which each agent has a “single-
peaked preference.” Given a point or a target in an interval, the associated target rule is described
as follows: if the target is “Pareto-eﬃcient,” then the rule chooses this point; otherwise, it chooses
the point in the set of Pareto-eﬃcient points that is closest to the target.
4Thus, the properties listed in Theorem 1 are logically independent. Note that the
feasibility rule satisﬁes reduction-consistency but violates one-agent eﬃciency. The
ﬁxed-order rules satisfy one-agent eﬃciency and reduction-consistency, but violate
converse reduction-consistency. The modiﬁed feasibility rule satisﬁes one-agent eﬃ-
ciency and converse reduction-consistency, but violates reduction-consistency. Thus,
the properties listed in Theorem 2 are independent.
4 Concluding remarks
We proposed an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the con-
verse of reduction-consistency (Yeh, 2006), and studied its implications. We showed
that the Pareto rule is the only eﬃcient rule satisfying the property (Theorem 1),
suggesting that converse reduction-consistency is quite demanding. In the theory of
TU games, Peleg (1985, 1986) and Tadenuma (1992) showed that “individual ratio-
nality” together with “consistency” implies “Pareto-optimality.” We obtained a sim-
ilar result for the model under consideration. Namely, one-agent eﬃciency together
with reduction-consistency implies eﬃciency (Lemma 1). Exploiting Theorem 1 and
Lemma 1 gives us another characterization of the Pareto rule: it is the only rule satis-
fying one-agent eﬃciency, reduction-consistency, and converse reduction-consistency.
This result is parallel to Peleg and Tijs (1996)’s characterization of Nash equilibrium
solution for games in strategic form.
One may wonder whether it is crucial for the results to write the hypothesis of
converse reduction-consistency for all subsets of the set of agents rather than for
subsets of size 2. The answer is yes. The following rule, R∗, shows that if the
hypothesis of converse reduction-consistency is made only for subsets of size 2, the
Pareto rule is not the only rule satisfying eﬃciency and the new version of converse
reduction-consistency just deﬁned. The rule R∗ is deﬁned as follows: for each N ∈
N and each (X,P) ∈ DN, if |N| = 2, then R∗ (X,P) ≡ Top(X,P); otherwise,
R∗ (X,P) ≡ PE (X,P).
In Section 3, we introduced the three rules, Z, F P0, Z∗, to illustrate that the
properties listed in each of our characterizations are logically independent. In Section
4, we introduced the rule, R∗, to illustrate that the Pareto rule is not the only rule
satisfying eﬃciency and the converse reduction-consistency for subsets of size 2. To
summarize these results, we make the following table.
Property \ Rule Z F P0 Z∗ R∗
one-agent eﬃciency No Yes Yes Yes
eﬃciency No Yes No Yes
reduction-consistency Yes Yes No No
converse reduction-consistency Yes No Yes No
converse reduction-consistency for subsets of size 2 Yes No Yes Yes
Table 1: The notation “Yes” (“No”) means that a certain rule satisﬁes (violates) a
certain property.
5Appendix
In the text, we claim that the ﬁxed-order rules and the rule R∗ violate converse
reduction-consistency. Here are proofs.
Claim 1 The ﬁxed order rules violate converse reduction-consistency.
Proof. The proof is by means of an example. Let N ≡ {1,2,3}, X ≡ {x,y,z}, and






















Clearly, for each N0 ⊂ N, {x} = F P0 (rx
N0 (X,P)). However, {y} = F P0 (X,P).
Q.E.D.
Claim 2 The rule R∗ violates converse reduction-consistency.
Proof. The proof is by means of an example. Let N ≡ {1,2} and X ≡ {x,y,z}.












Clearly, for each N0 ⊂ N, {y} = R∗ (rx
N0 (X,P)). However, R∗ (X,P) ≡ {x,z}.
Q.E.D.
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